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Product Liability For a Defective House
Joseph A. Valore*
1967 THERE WERE CONSTRUCTED in the United States, 845,000 1 new,
private, residential, single dwellings, with a total cost to the builder
2
in land, labor and materials of 14.6 billion dollars. This is obviously a
big business. Many of these dwellings are of the mass produced or tract
variety.
Sale of these dwellings is generally in one of two ways. The developer may construct a model house, or several different model houses
within the development which are completely finished. Prospective purchasers view these models and select one which they desire, or the
purchaser may select a basic style and incorporate features he desires to
serve his own needs. After selection of the style desired, the prospective
purchaser then views the lots available in the development, and chooses
one for the site of his house. Once the style and lot are selected the
prospective purchaser and the builder or his agent enter into an agreement for the sale of the new house.
The second common method of sale is much the same. It differs in
that the builder may start building the dwelling before the purchaser is
known. While the house is under construction, the purchaser arrives on
the scene, and negotiates for the purchase of the dwelling upon completion.
In either situation the purchaser, having signed the agreement, may
wonder what guarantees he has that the dwelling will be completed in a
5
workmanlike fashion, 3 free from defects, 4 and inhabitable.
To understand the current attitude of the courts regarding the rights
and liabilities as between a builder-vendor and a vendee, a look at the
historical development of the law of real property is essential.
During the feudal period, land was the basis of power.6 He who
controlled the land controlled the people. So it developed that trans7
actions involving the sale of land were solemn occasions, whereby the
seller and the buyer performed certain rituals clearly evidencing their
intention regarding the transaction. Once they had completed the sale,
N

* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; Claims representative for Nationwide Insurance Company.
1 United States Department of Commerce Construction Report; Sales of New One
Family Homes: Annual Statistics, No. C-25-67-13 (1967).
2 Ibid.
3 Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P. 2d 158 (Okla., 1963).
4 Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E. 2d 819 (1957).
5 Carpenter v. Donahoe, 158 Colo. 78, 388 P. 2d 399 (1964).
6 Walsh, Law of Real Property, 508 (1947).
7 Casner & Leach, Cases and Text on Property, 253 (1947, with 1964 supp.).
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the courts were very reluctant to invalidate the transaction. The doctrine
of caveat emptor prevailed. It was felt that where two parties had dealt
in an arms-length transaction, and the buyer had ample opportunity to
examine the land prior to the sale, he was bound by the bargain he had
made.
Of course, where there was fraud or misrepresentation perpetrated
on the buyer, the bargain was subject to recision.8
This doctrine of caveat emptor has its application to the sale of
chattels as well as realty. During the course of negotiations for the sale of
goods, the buyer secured whatever warranties as to the quality of the
goods the seller was willing to give. Once the agreement was completed,
the parties were bound to the contract. Should either party commit a
breach, the injured party had recourse through the court for his damages.
Where, however, one not in privy to the contract was injured and sought
recovery, the court dismissed the action based on a lack of contractual
privity.9 The court refused to hear an action brought by one who was
not an original party to the contract of sale.
The Industrial Revolution changed all of this. The seller no longer
dealt with the buyer; goods were manufactured in large quantities and
the buyer was often the last link in a long chain from the manufacturer.
Finally in 1916, MacPherson v. Buick 10 was decided. This case involved
injuries to the plaintiff as a result of a defective wheel on a car manufactured by the defendant. The court held that where an object, if
negligently constructed, is certain to place one in danger, the manufacturer is strictly liable to all who might reasonably be expected to use the
product even though the injured party is not in privity to the sale.
Thus we see the beginning of liability of a manufacturer for goods
he produces.1 Though this doctrine has been applied to manufacturers
of chattels with increasing frequency, there has been great reluctance to
apply the same view to building contractors. 12 The courts felt that where
a vendor has given up the title and possession to the vendee, since he
no longer has any duty to repair the property and is not in control of the
premises, he should not be liable for injuries sustained by the vendee, or
a third party, due to defects which existed at the time of the sale. 13
This was the general rule as applied in the United States14 and
England. 15 However, certain exceptions to this rule developed. In a
Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L. J., 1138 (1931).
9 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &W. 109 (1842).
10 MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, § 5.03 (1) (1967).
12 Prosser, Torts, § 99, at 693 (3d ed. 1964).
13 Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 182 Penna. 82, 37 A. 995 (1897).
14 Annot., 41 A.L.R. 842 (1926).
15 Bottomley v. Bannister, 1 K.B. 458 (1932).
8
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1931 English case, 16 the court took a different view. Here the plaintiff
had entered into a contract to purchase a house from the defendant. At
the time of the signing of the contract the house was still under construction. Oral statements made by the defendant at the time of the sale
were to the effect that he would use the best material and perform the
work in the best workmanlike manner. Nothing to this effect was put
into the agreement. Sometime after plaintiff took possession of the
house, it was found that due to defects in construction, excess dampness
penetrated the house making it unfit for the plaintiff to live in. The
plaintiff brought an action for damages for breach of contract. The
defendant answered by stating he did not breach any duty to the plaintiff,
as the contract of sale did not contain any warranties, either express or
implied. The court in deciding for plaintiff, held that where a purchaser
buys a dwelling, which is still under construction, there is an implied
warranty, that upon completion the dwelling will be fit for the purpose
intended and habitable.
In deciding the case, the court was very careful to make the distinction that its ruling applied only to a dwelling which was unfinished at the
time of purchase. The rule regarding dwellings which were sold after
17
completion was not changed.
American Decisions: Caveat Emptor v. Implied Warranty
The position of the American courts regarding the matter of the
liability of a builder-vendor for his work is best answered by examining
cases from some of the various jurisdictions to see how the problem has
been handled.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in 1959, reviewed the case of Steiber v.
Palumbo 18 wherein the plaintiff brought an action for breach of an
implied warranty of quality. The plaintiff, some six years prior, had
purchased a newly completed house from the defendant-builder. The
dwelling had been built over fill dirt and subsequently settled into the
ground unevenly. In upholding the lower court verdict in favor of the
builder, the court stated that there are no implied warranties in a contract for the sale of real property and the doctrine of caveat emptor
prevails. The purchaser who fails to secure for himself express warranties in the sale agreement is precluded from any action on the basis
of implied warranty, when a defective condition is discovered.
In the same year that the Oregon case was decided, the Arizona
Supreme Court decided a similar case. 19 Here the plaintiff took a somewhat different approach: The dwelling which he purchased from defend16 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estate Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931).
17 Perry v. Sharon Development Co. Ltd., 4 All. E.R. 390 (1937).

219 Ore. 479, 347 P. 2d 978 (1959).
19 Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P. 2d 923 (1959).
18
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ant-builder had been used as a model house, prior to the sale. Shortly
after moving in, plaintiff found that the central air conditioning system
was defective. He brought suit for breach of an implied warranty of
quality. However, realizing that Arizona had the same view as that of
Oregon, plaintiff took the position that the air conditioning system was
not part of the real property, but was personal property to which the
implied warranty would apply. This contention was rejected and it was
held that the air conditioning system was a permanent fixture and a part
of the realty. Since there are no implied warranties as to quality or
condition in the sale of real property in Arizona, plaintiff's action failed.
The purchaser of a new house in Georgia thought he had a good
case against his builder-vendor 20 when damage to his house resulted
from the builder's failure to comply with a local city ordinance regarding construction of the dwelling. The court, however, said the true
issue to be decided was whether the law implies a warranty as to condition or quality of a house which is completed at the time of sale. It
was held that the doctrine of caveat emptor is in effect in Georgia, and
therefore, there are no implied warranties in the sale of real property.
In a 1952 case, 2 1 Maryland had affirmed the doctrine of caveat emptor
as applying to its jurisdiction. This position was challenged by litigation
in a later case, 2 2 in which a builder-vendor, in constructing tract type
dwellings, placed heating units in the houses which failed to properly
heat the house. It was held that the defendant did not warrant that the
heating units would properly heat the house, but that he was only
required to install heating units in a good and workmanlike manner. If
they did not properly heat the houses, defendant was not liable. The
most recent Maryland decision, Allen v. Wilkenson23 though acknowledging a new trend toward implied warranties, refused to stray from the
established rule that no such warranties exist, holding that it is for the
legislature, and not the courts to abrogate the doctrine of caveat emptor.
In Tudor v. Mobley,2 4 the Indiana Appellate Court stated that
Steiber v. Palumbo25 was on the same issue and favored the ruling in
that case. The court went on to state that where a purchaser deals in an
arms-length transaction and has ample opportunity to inspect the premises before purchase, no warranties will be implied in the sale of a new
house.
Alabama placed its name among the states holding there are no
implied warranties in the sale of newly completed houses, in a 1961 deciWalton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753, 131 S.E. 2d 655 (C.A., 1963).
Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A. 2d 376 (C.A., 1952) (water leaked into basement, due to faulty construction).
22 Gilbert Construction Co. Inc. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A. 2d 518 (C.A., 1957).
23 250 Md. 395, 243 A. 2d 515 (1968).
24 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E. 2d 442 (1961).
25 Steiber v. Palumbo, supra note 18.
20
21
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sion.26 The same court, however, in 1967,2 allowed recovery to a vendee

against the builder-vendor. The vendee and builder had entered into a
contract, whereby the builder was to construct a house on a lot in the
builder's subdivision. During the course of the negotiations vendee was
shown the plans and specifications for his house. Defects discovered
after the vendee moved in were found to have resulted from the builder's
failure to comply with the plans and specifications. The court distinguished this case from the above, by stating that the builder's action in
showing the plans and specifications to vendee amounted to an express
warranty that the house would be built accordingly. The agreement
between the parties was one for personal services and not for the sale of
realty. Therefore, the doctrine of caveat emptor had no application.
In Skiarsky v. Wayne Lawrence Construction Corp.,28 the New
York court refused to allow the purchaser to recover damages due to
latent defects in the construction of his new house. Here the parties had
stipulated in their agreement that delivery of the deed by the buildervendor to the purchaser was evidence of full compliance with the terms
of the contract. It was felt that since the agreement had included this
provision, there was no implied warranty of good workmanship, and the
builder was not liable for latent defects.
Four years later, in 1965,29 this same court refused to follow the
above ruling when presented with a similar case. Here the purchase
agreement stated that the house would be built in a good and workmanlike manner. This was interpreted by the court to be an express warranty. Defendant had argued that the purchaser could not maintain his
action because the purchase agreement was merged with the deed, and
the agreement had stated that conveyance of the deed constituted full
compliance by the vendor. Therefore no action for breach was available.
In holding that an action for breach of express warranty was available
the decision went on to state that the trend in the law today is that there
are implied warranties where a house is sold prior to completion, and
that the house must be built in a good and workmanlike manner. However, since the facts indicate an express warranty was made, it was not
necessary to determine if any implied warranties existed in this case.
Both Washington 30 and Oklahoma 31 hold that there are no implied
Druid Homes Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961).
Carter v. West et ex., 280 Ala. 630, 196 So. 2d 718 (1967).
28 28 Misc. 2d 391, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (S. Ct., Nassau Cty., 1961).
29 Staff v. Lido Dune, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (S. Ct., Nassau Cty.,
1965) (Court distinguishes between latent defects and defects discoverable at the
time title passes).
30 Hoye v. Century Bldgs., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P. 2d 474 (1958) (defective sewer
system resulting in discharge of raw sewage into premises).
31 Jones v. Gatewood, s-upra note 3 (water leaking into house).
26
27
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warranties of quality or condition in a house which is complete at the
time of sale. But where the purchase agreement is entered into when the
house is still under construction, the builder-vendor impliedly warrants
that upon completion the dwelling will be reasonably fit for habitation
and built in a good and workmanlike manner.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in reversing a lower court, went one step
further in holding for the purchaser of a new house.32 The plaintiff had
purchased the house while it was under construction. The buildervendor had built the house over an open irrigation ditch which had been
filled with dirt. After plaintiff moved in, he found water seeping into
the basement from the ditch, making the house uninhabitable. Not only
did the court hold that there was an implied warranty that the house
would be free from major defects and habitable, but it also stated that
the builders knowledge of the ditch, his efforts to fill it, and his failure
to inform the plaintiff of the presence of the ditch amounted to constructive fraud on his part and allowed the plaintiff to rescind the agreement.
The builder-vendor had based his argument in the lower court on the
33
ruling in Steiber v. Palumbo.
This decision indicates that where the parties to a contract are in an
unequal position, and the purchaser relies on the skill and knowledge
of the builder who holds himself out to be an expert in his field, the
builder does impliedly warrant that the house he builds is fit for the
purpose intended.
South Dakota also holds that an implied warranty arises in the sale
of a new house by a builder-vendor, and that such warranty survives
the delivery of the deed. The warranty implied, however, is not one of
fitness for purpose intended, but rather of reasonable workmanship and
habitability. Thus in Wagoner v. Midwstern Development,34 the South
Dakota Supreme Court said:
The builder is not required to construct a perfect house, and in
determining whether a house is defective, the test is reasonableness
35
and not perfection.
The position of Colorado is best stated by examining three cases
decided in its jurisdiction. In 1960, the court allowed a purchaser 36 to
rescind a purchase agreement where the house was built on fill dirt and
sank into the ground. The court in this case discussed the theory of
warranty of fitness for habitation, but did not hold that such a warranty
existed. Instead, the court held that the vendor's failure to inform the
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Ida. 55, 415 P. 2d 698 (1966).
Steiber v. Palumbo, supra note 18.
34 154 N.W. 2d 803 (1967).
35 Id. at 809.
36 Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P. 2d 366 (1960).
32
33
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purchaser of the fact that the house was constructed on fill dirt amounted
to concealment of a latent defect, of which the vendor had knowledge.
Plaintiff was permitted to rescind on the basis of the vendor's fraud.
Three years later, a decision was rendered holding that where a
house is sold while under construction, there was an implied warranty
by the builder that the house, when completed, would be fit for habita37
tion.
Finally in 1964, the court stated in Carpenter v. Donahoe,35 that the
determination of the existence of implied warranties in the sale of a new
house should not be based on whether the dwelling was finished or
unfinished at the time of sale, as such a distinction was inconsistent. It
was therefore held that a builder-vendor does impliedly warrant that the
house he builds will be suitable for habitation and constructed in a quality manner, and this implied warranty exists whether the house was
complete or not at the time of sale.
This same view was expressed most recently by the Texas Supreme
Court 39 when it indicated that the doctrine of caveat emptor had no
application to a situation involving a builder-vendor and the purchaser
of a new house.
In Illinois, the existence of implied warranties in the sale of a new
house is determined by the district court in which the buyer brings his
action. The Appellate Court in the First District has held that where the
house was not complete at the time of sale, there is an implied warranty
that upon completion the dwelling will be fit for habitation. 40 The
Appellate Court in the Third District, one year later, although acknowledging the above decision, held that there are no implied warranties as to
quality, condition, or fitness for habitation in the sale of a new house.
41
This is true whether the house is finished or not at the time of sale.
In a few jurisdictions the new trend toward builder's liability based
on implied warranty has been followed, although the courts have not yet
had occasion to decide a case dealing directly with private residential
dwellings.
In Minnesota, for example, an implied warranty of fitness for the
purpose intended was found to exist in the construction of a commercial
structure. 42 In Iowa similar warranties were found in the construction
43
of an onion warehouse.
Glisan v. Smolenski, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P. 2d 260 (1963).
154 Colo. 78, 388 P. 2d 399 (1964) (cracked walls and sagging walks).
39 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W. 2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
40 Weck v. AM Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E. 2d 728 (1962).
41 Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E. 2d 780 (1963).
42 Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co., 274 Minn.
17, 143 N.W. 2d 626 (1966).
43 Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 106 N.W. 2d 59 (1960).
37
38
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It seems likely that should a purchaser of a residential dwelling
seek to hold his builder-vendor liable upon the theory of implied warranty, in these jurisdictions, he will be successful.
Tort Theory
The cases presented thus far have attempted to resolve the issue of
the liability of a builder-vendor by the application of contract law.
However, this is not the sole remedy available to the purchaser. Many
courts have allowed recovery based on an action in tort for negligence.
Much has been written 44 as to whether a purchaser's action should be
on the contract or in tort.
The following are some cases where the issues were resolved based
on an action in tort, or through the application of a combination of contract and tort law.
One of the earliest cases in this country concerning the issue of
defective construction in a new house occurred in 1925 in Tennessee. 45
Here the defendant-vendor had sold a newly completed house to the
purchaser. Defendant was not the builder, but had hired a contractor to
build this house along with three other houses on the same street. Sometime after moving in, the purchaser noticed that the heavy stone mantel
over the fireplace was separated from the wall. He advised defendant
of this condition. Defendant examined the mantel and told the purchaser
that it was sound. Shortly thereafter, the mantel collapsed on purchaser's
minor son, causing his death. Purchaser brought an action against
defendant, for negligence in construction, and failure of defendant to
advise purchaser of the defective condition of the mantel. The mantel
was found to be constructed improperly and negligently. In holding for
the defendant, the court stated that he had no actual knowledge of the
dangerous condition at the time of the sale, and applied the doctrine of
caveat emptor, holding that once title passed to the purchaser, defendant
was no longer liable for any injuries which resulted due to defects in the
premises. The Tennessee court had an opportunity to change this view
when it reviewed a case in 1966.46 Here the builder had sold a newly
completed house to plaintiff and her husband. After moving in, plaintiff
was injured when steps to the basement, which were not adequately
braced, collapsed. Although the court affirmed the ruling in the prior
case and held that caveat emptor still prevailed, a decision was rendered
for the plaintiff. The court said where a dwelling is constructed by
Roberts, The Unwary Home Buyer, 52 Corn. L. Q. 835 (1967); Prosser, Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960).
45 Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925).
46 Gillenwater v. Gasteiger, 417 S.W. 2d 568 (Tenn. CA., cert. denied, 1966); see
also, Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W. 2d 441 (S. Ct.,
1961) (Plaintiff fell through opening in attic).
44
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a vendor's workman, the vendor is presumed to have actual knowledge
of dangerous conditions, and his failure to warn the purchaser of such
conditions will make him liable for injuries.
Some jurisdictions have experienced great difficulty in overcoming
the doctrine of caveat emptor. New Jersey is one such state. In Levy v.
47
C. Young Construction Co., Inc., the purchaser of a newly completed

house sued the builder-vendor when he experienced trouble with the
sewer system. The Appeals court applied the doctrine of caveat emptor
and held the builder not liable for latent defects. There was a dissent in
the case, which took the view that where a builder holds himself to be
experienced and knowledgeable in his field, he impliedly warrants his
product and should be held liable for defects. The purchaser appealed to
the New Jersey Supreme Court 48 which affirmed the lower court ruling,
on the ground that the purchaser had failed to prove that his sewer
problems were caused by improper installation by the builder. The decision went on to say that the rule of caveat emptor was harsh and unjust,
and its application in the modern commercial world was highly questionable. However, since the case could be resolved without deciding the
validity of this doctrine, such a decision would be put off to another day.
That day came sooner than expected: The very next year Sarnicande
v. Lake Developers Inc.49 came before the court. Here the plaintiff was
the mother of the purchaser, and leased a part of the house from the
purchaser. Shortly after moving in, purchaser discovered a defective
step and asked the builder to make repairs. The repairs were never
made. Plaintiff was injured two years after purchaser had taken possession of the house. The court again was able to resolve the case without
evaluating the caveat emptor rule. It held that inasmuch as purchaser
had taken possession with full knowledge of the defective step, it became
his duty to keep the premises reasonably safe and free from defects and
the purchaser was therefore negligent for allowing this condition to exist
for over two years without doing something about it.
Opportunity knocked again in the form of an action by the purchaser
against the builder-vendor for faulty construction of purchaser's new
house. 50 Once again the court did some fancy footwork to avoid ruling
on the doctrine of caveat emptor, and here found that the purchaser had
been given an oral warranty that the house would be habitable and fit
for the purpose intended.
The day of decision finally arrived with Schipper v. Lewitt and Sons,
Inc.5 1 In this case the plaintiff was the minor son of lessee. Lessor had
purchased the house new from defendant, who was a mass producer of
47 46 N.J. Supp. 293, 134 A. 2d 717 (1957).

*8 26 N.J. 330, 139 A. 2d 738 (1958).
49 55 N.J. Supp. 475, 151 A. 2d 48 (C.A., 1959).
50 Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A. 2d 369 (S. Ct., 1963).
51 44 N.J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (S. Ct., 1965).
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houses. Defendant, in an effort to keep production costs down, had not
installed a temperature regulator on the hot water tank. As a result,
plaintiff was severely scalded by water from the bathroom tap. The
court stated that the application of caveat emptor was fine where the
buyer and the seller had equal bargaining positions and could protect
themselves in negotiating the agreement. But today the buyer of a
private residential dwelling is not in an equal position to bargain and
provide for his protection. This is especially true where the seller is a
mass producer of houses. It is not harsh or unjust to hold such a builder
to strict liability, as he represents himself to be skilled and experienced
in the field and the buyer, relying on this knowledge, has a right to expect
that the house he purchases will be fit for habitation.
Such a builder-vendor can protect himself through the purchase of
insurance, thereby making the risk of loss a cost of doing business and
passing this cost on to all of his purchasers.
It will be observed that this decision went only so far as to hold a
tract developer or mass producer of houses to strict liability in tort,
where a house is defective at the time of sale. The burden is still on the
plaintiff to prove that the condition which resulted in damage or injury to
him was the result of faulty construction on the part of the buildervendor and was unreasonably dangerous.
Although the decision speaks of the buyer and seller, the court held
that this protection was also extended to include those persons who might
reasonably be expected to use the house, thus allowing for plaintiff's
recovery.
Most recently, the rule of Schipper v. Lewitt, which had been applied
to tract developers only, has been expanded to include all building con52
tractors.
This idea of strict liability of a vendor was examined in a recent
California decision.5 3 Here the vendor was a land developer who had
contracted to have a house built which upon completion, was sold to
plaintiff. The house had been built on a slope. The condition of the soil
and drainage in the area was such that heavy rains created the possibility
of a landslide, thus threatening to move the house. Plaintiff sued for
recision of the contract. The court first examined the theory of strict
liability in tort as applied to the manufacturer of a product, but refused
to apply the same thinking to the builder of a house. The opinion stated
that since a real estate transaction takes some time to be completed, the
purchaser has ample time to inspect the premises. However, once having
made these statements, the opinion states that plaintiff may recover if
the vendor was guilty of negligence in construction of the house. Here
the court found that the defendant was aware of the fact that the area
52

Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A. 2d 1 (1968).

53 Conolley v. Bull, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (C.A., 1968).
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was susceptible to landslides, and that soil tests were advised to determine what drainage and construction was necessary to protect against
a landslide. It was also stated that defendant owed plaintiff, or anyone
who might be expected to buy the house, a duty to use reasonable care in
construction.
The decision refuses to find any implied warranties in the sale of
real property, but allows a purchaser to recover, if he can prove that the
builder was negligent in construction of the house.
The District of Columbia 54 and South Carolina 55 have taken the
California position, in holding that a builder-vendor will be liable for
defects to a dwelling, which are the result of his negligence, thus allowing recovery to a purchaser or an invitee who sustains injury or damages.
A discussion of the view taken by Ohio has been saved for last, as
there is some confusion as to what the view actually is.
In Shapiro v. Kornick,56 the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
held that no implied warranties as to fitness for habitation existed where
a new house was completed at the time of sale. The decision stated that
the plaintiff should be allowed to recover if he could prove that at the
time of sale, the defects of which he complained were known to the
vendor. Recovery was based on vendor's fraud for failure to inform the
plaintiff of such defective conditions. The question of vendor's knowledge
was one of fact to be determined by a jury.
Two years later the same court, in Vanderschrierv. Aaron,5 7 ruled
that where a purchaser entered into a purchase agreement prior to completion of the dwelling, the builder-vendor did impliedly warrant that
upon completion the house would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and would be reasonably fit for habitation. This decision
cited the reasoning in the English case of Perry v. Sharon Development
Co. Ltd.5s discussed earlier, as being sound, and applied it in rendering
the decision.
This represented one of the earliest cases, decided in any American
jurisdiction, which held that implied warranties existed in the sale of a
new house. Of course, the application was only to those houses unfinished at the time of sale.
In 1966, the Court of Appeals for Lucas County submitted to the
Ohio Supreme Court the case of Mitchum v. Johnson5 9 as being in con54 Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 240 F. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 1956)

(collapse of
steps due to improper support).
55 Rogers v. Scyphers, 161 S.E. 2d 81 (So. Car. S. Ct., 1968) (collapse of folding stairway to attic).
56 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E. 2d 175 (1955).
57 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E. 2d 819 (1957) (sewer back up due to faulty construction).
58 Supra note 17.

59 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E. 2d 594 (1966); See also, Huber v. Bachman, 12 Ohio
Misc. 22, 230 N.E. 2d 461 (1967).
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flict with the above case. Here plaintiff had entered into a purchase
agreement with the builder. At the time the agreement was made, the
house was still unfinished. The builder had agreed to complete construction as part of the contract. After purchaser moved in, he found defects
which resulted in water damage to the structure. The opinion distinguished this case from the preceding case by pointing out that Vanderschrierinvolved the sale of an unfinished dwelling, while the present case
involved an executed contract for the sale of real property, in which the
builder agreed to complete construction. Where such a situation exists,
there are no implied warranties that the completed structure will be
reasonably fit for habitation. The duty imposed on the builder is to
construct the dwelling in a workmanlike manner, and to exercise the
care and skill which is reasonably expected of one in his business. Where
defects later develop over which he has no control and which are not his
fault, he will not be liable if such defects make the dwelling uninhabitable. The builder is not an insurer of the fitness for habitation of the
dwelling.
The feeling is that the doctrine of caveat emptor is so deeply ingrained in our law of real property that a builder should be held liable
only where the facts clearly indicate negligence. A standard of ordinary
care and skill should be applied, and a builder-vendor will only be held
to impliedly warrant that the work he does will be done in a workmanlike manner and no implied warranty as to fitness for habitation exists.
The Ohio Supreme Court, by this decision, has thus taken the
rather clear position as reflected in Vanderschrier and created clouds by
indicating it is not the facts which will be examined, but rather the
court's interpretation of the nature of the purchase agreement. There
seems little difference between the facts of these two cases to justify any
other observation.
Conclusions
It is obvious that the doctrine of caveat emptor is dying very slowly
and with much reluctance. The 1936 edition of Williston on Contracts60
contains statements to the effect that no implied warranties existed in the
sale of real property. The 1963 edition 61 of the same work indicates that
where the seller is a mass producer of dwellings, it is not unjust to hold
that he impliedly warrants the houses he builds. He represents himself
to be skilled and experienced, and the buyer has a right to rely on this
knowledge of the builder. It is not unreasonable for the buyer to expect
his finished house to be fit for habitation. Such a view is entirely in keeping with the trend in the law to hold the manufacturer liable for defects
60

4 Williston, Law of Contracts, § 926 (rev. ed. 1936).

61 7 Williston, Law of Contracts, §§ 926, 926A (3d ed. 1963).
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in his product. There seems little difference between one who mass
produces cars 62 and one who mass produces houses, and even less
reason for applying a different law to judge each. A builder should be
held to warrant his product to be free from defects and to be suitable for
the use intended. The cases reflect the growing desire to provide the
buyer of a new house with this protection. Yet, protection is generally
extended only to one who buys a house which is not finished. It seems to
make little sense to deny recovery to a buyer simply because he has
purchased a finished dwelling. He certainly expects the same quality and
workmanship in his house as does the buyer of the unfinished house.
A very recent case, Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Assoc.,6 2 from California, even held a financial institution liable to a
home buyer, for faulty construction, when the financier had participated
in control over the building development, knowing the building company
to be thinly capitalized, and that risk of harm to the buyers was reasonably foreseeable. This is another step in the direction of protection of
the consumer in our society.
In the final analysis, it seems we must be satisfied with what has
been achieved thus far in overcoming caveat emptor, and rely on the
general trend in recent decisions to finally put this doctrine to rest.
62
63

Henningson v. Bloomfield Motor Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
73 Calif. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1969).
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